Philosophical Foundations of the Objective
Status: NORMATIVE GROUNDING. The objective function is adapted from established philosophical frameworks, not invented from scratch.
Frankfurt's hierarchical desire theory (1971)
Provides the structural account of what "evaluative access" means. Persons distinguished from wantons by capacity for second-order volitions. The architecture's "capacity to access evaluative processes" is an engineering translation.
The bridge to neuroscience: PFC offline + impulse-driven behavior = temporary wanton state. This specific neuroscience bridge (Frankfurt's wanton state has a measurable neurobiological mechanism via Arnsten 2009, 2015) appears novel. White (2025, "Techno-Wantons," Topoi 44:545-557) independently extends Frankfurt to technology-induced states ("techno-wantonness"), identifying adaptive scaffolding that panders to first-order preferences while degrading second-order volition. White does not identify the catecholamine-PFC mechanism; the neurobiological bridge remains this project's contribution. [VERIFIED -- full paper reviewed 2026-04-09]
Bratman's planning theory (2007, 2017)
Provides the temporal dimension. Self-governance involves guidance by self-governing policies -- higher-order structures about what to treat as reason-providing. Philosophical anchor for the "coherence across time" component: the architecture must maintain conditions for temporally extended self-governance.
Sen and Nussbaum's capability approach (1992-2011)
Provides the evaluative framework. Sen's capabilities/functionings distinction directly grounds the focus on capacity rather than behavior. Nussbaum's argument that capabilities are the appropriate goals provides anti-paternalism justification.
Critical complication: Nussbaum's list is pluralist -- practical reason is one capability among many. The "uniquely correct objective" claim requires the meta-capability defense: autonomy-capacity is the precondition for any other capability mattering to the person. This defense is available but contested.
Verbeek (2006)
Design-ethics bridge. Mediation theory argues for deploying mediation analysis normatively in design. Closer to engineering than most philosophy of technology, but remains a design methodology, not a control-theoretic objective function.
Hostile scaffolding literature (4E cognition)
A growing body of work within 4E cognitive science critiques the "dogma of harmony" (Aagaard 2021) -- the tendency to portray human-technology relations as cooperative and beneficial. Key contributions:
- Slaby (2016): "Mind invasion" -- institutional scaffolding that hacks affectivity against an agent's prior orientations. Paradigm cases: toxic corporate environments, prisons.
- Timms & Spurrett (2023): Formal framework for hostile scaffolding -- external structures deliberately deployed at one agent's expense.
- Spurrett (2024): Hostile affective technologies (casinos, cigarettes). Extends mind invasion concept.
- White (2025): Argues mind invasion is misapplied to adaptive technology. Introduces "techno-wantonness" -- technology that panders to existing preferences rather than imposing alien ones.
This literature provides philosophical articulation of what AgentSee defends against. See hostile-scaffolding-literature.md for full positioning.
What the philosophical literature does NOT contain
An explicit control-theoretic objective function + state estimation + stabilizer topology for maintaining human autonomy in real time. The capability approach provides the evaluative space. Frankfurt and Bratman provide the structural account. Neither provides the engineering.
Positioning statement
The objective function instantiates the capability approach in engineering terms and operationalizes procedural autonomy (Frankfurt/Bratman) as a measurable control target. The philosophical argument for capacity-over-behavior is substantially anticipated. The control-theoretic translation -- with neurobiological grounding, state estimation, and caring governance -- is not.